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Abstract
We describe a method to upper bound the quantum query complexity of Boolean formula
evaluation problems, using fundamental theorems about the general adversary bound. This
nonconstructive method can give an upper bound on query complexity without producing an
algorithm. For example, we describe an oracle problem which we prove (non-constructively) can
be solved in O(1) queries, where the previous best quantum algorithm uses a polylogarithmic
number of queries. We then give an explicit O(1)-query algorithm for this problem based on
span programs.
1 Introduction
The general adversary bound has proven to be a powerful concept in quantum computing. Originally
formulated as a lower bound on the quantum query complexity of Boolean functions [6], it was proven
to be a tight bound both for the query complexity of evaluating discrete finite functions and for
the query complexity of the more general problem of state conversion [8]. The general adversary
bound is the culmination of a series of adversary methods [1, 2]. While the adversary method in
its various forms has been useful in finding lower bounds on quantum query complexity [3, 7, 11],
the general adversary bound itself can be difficult to apply, as the quantity for even simple, few-bit
functions must usually be calculated numerically [6, 11].
One of the nicest properties of the general adversary bound is that it behaves well under com-
position [8]. This fact has been used to lower bound the query complexity of evaluating composed
total functions, and to create optimal algorithms for composed total functions [11]. Here, we extend
one of the composition results to partial Boolean functions, and use it to upper bound the query
complexity of Boolean functions. We do this by obtaining an upper bound on the general adversary
bound.
Generally, finding an upper bound on the general adversary bound is just as difficult as finding
an algorithm, as they are dual problems [8]. However, using the composition property of the general
adversary bound, when given an algorithm for a Boolean function f composed d times, we obtain
an upper bound on the general adversary bound of f . Due to the tightness of the general adversary
bound and query complexity, this procedure gives an upper bound on the query complexity of f , but
because it is nonconstructive, it doesn’t give any hint as to what the corresponding algorithm for f
might look like. The procedure is a bit counter-intuitive: we obtain information about an algorithm
for a simpler function by creating an algorithm for a more complex function. This is similar in spirit
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to the tensor power trick, where an inequality between two terms is proven by considering tensor
powers of those terms1.
We describe a class of oracle problems called Constant-Fault Direct Trees (introduced by
Zhan et al. [13]), for which this method proves the existence of an O(1) query algorithm. While this
method does not give an explicit algorithm, we show that a span program algorithm achieves this
bound. The previous best algorithm for Constant-Fault Direct Trees has a query complexity
that is polylogarithmic in the size of the problem.
In Section 2 we describe the upper bound on the general adversary bound. In Section 3 we
apply this bound to Constant-Fault Direct Trees and prove the existence of a constant query
algorithm. In Section 4 we describe the span program based quantum algorithm for Constant-
Fault Direct Trees.
2 A Nonconstructive Upper Bound on Query Complexity
Our procedure for creating a nonconstructive upper bound on query complexity relies on the fact
that the general adversary bound behaves well under composition and is a tight lower bound on
quantum query complexity. The standard definition of the general adversary bound is not necessary
for our purposes, but can be found in [7], and an alternate definition appears in Appendix A.
Our procedure applies to Boolean functions. A function f is Boolean if f : S → {0, 1} with
S ⊆ {0, 1}n. Given a Boolean function f and a natural number d, we define fd, “f composed d
times,” recursively as fd = f ◦ (fd−1, . . . , fd−1), where f1 = f .
Now we state the main result:
Theorem 1. Suppose we have a (possibly partial) Boolean function f that is composed d times, fd,
and a quantum algorithm for fd that requires O(Jd) queries. Then Q(f) = O(J), where Q(f) is the
bounded-error quantum query complexity of f .
(For background on bounded-error quantum query complexity and quantum algorithms, see [1].)
There are seemingly similar results in the literature; for example, Reichardt proves in [9] that the
query complexity of a function composed d times, when raised to the 1/dth power, is equal to the
adversary bound of the function, in the limit that d goes to infinity. This result gives insight into the
exact query complexity of a function, and its relation to the general adversary bound. In contrast,
our result is a tool for upper bounding query complexity, possibly without gaining any knowledge
of the exact query complexity of the function.
One might think that Theorem 1 is useless because an algorithm for fd usually comes from
composing an algorithm for f . If J is the query complexity of the algorithm for f , one expects the
query complexity of the resulting algorithm for fd to be at least Jd. In this case, Theorem 1 gives
no new insight. Luckily for us, composed quantum algorithms do not always follow this scaling. If
there is a quantum algorithm for f that uses J queries, where J is not optimal (i.e. is larger than
the true bounded error quantum query complexity of f), then the number of queries used when the
algorithm is composed d times can be much less than Jd. If this is the case, and if the non-optimal
algorithm for f is the best known, Theorem 1 promises the existence of an algorithm for f that
uses fewer queries than the best known algorithm, but, as Theorem 1 is nonconstructive, it gives
no information as to the form of the algorithm.
We need two lemmas to prove Theorem 1:
1See Terence Tao’s blog, What’s New “Tricks Wiki article: The tensor power trick,"
http://terrytao.wordpress.com/2008/08/25/tricks-wiki-article-the-tensor-product-trick/
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Lemma 1. For any Boolean function f : S → {0, 1} with S ⊆ {0, 1}n and natural number d,
ADV±(fd) ≥ (ADV±(f))d. (1)
Høyer et al. [6] prove Lemma 1 for total Boolean functions2, and the result is extended to more
general total functions in [8]. Our contribution is to extend the result in [8] to partial Boolean
functions. While Theorem 1 still holds for total functions, the example we consider later in the
paper involves partial functions. The proof of Lemma 1 closely follows the proof in [8] and can be
found in Appendix A.
Lemma 2. (Lee, et al. [8]) For any function f : S → E, with S ∈ Dn, and E,D finite sets, the
bounded-error quantum query complexity of f , Q(f), satisfies
Q(f) = Θ(ADV±(f)). (2)
We now prove Theorem 1:
Proof. Given an algorithm for fd that requires O(Jd) queries, by Lemma 2,
ADV±(fd) = O(Jd). (3)
Combining Eq. (3) and Lemma 1,
(ADV±(f))d = O(Jd). (4)
Raising both sides to the 1/dth power,
ADV±(f) = O(J). (5)
We now have an upper bound on the general adversary bound of f . Finally, using Lemma 2 again,
we obtain
Q(f) = O(J). (6)
3 Example where the General Adversary Upper Bound is Useful
In this section we describe a function, called the 1-Fault Nand Tree, for which Theorem 1 gives
a better upper bound on query complexity than any previously known quantum algorithm. The
1-Fault Nand Tree was proposed by Zhan et al. [13] to obtain a super-polynomial speed-up for
a partial Boolean formula, and is a specific type of Constant-Fault Direct Tree, which was
mentioned in Section 1. We first define the Nand Tree, and then explain the allowed inputs to
the 1-Fault Nand Tree.
The Nand Tree is a complete, binary tree of depth d, where each node is assigned a bit value.
The leaves are assigned arbitrary values, and any internal node v is given the value nand(val(v1), val(v2)),
where v1 and v2 are v’s children, and val(vi) is the value of the node vi.
2While the statement of Theorem 11 in [6] seems to apply to partial functions, it is mis-stated; their proof actually
assumes total functions.
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To evaluate the Nand Tree, one must find the value of the root given an oracle for the values
of the leaves. (The Nand Tree is equivalent to solving nandd, although the composition we
will use for Theorem 1 is not the composition of the nand function, but of the Nand Tree as a
whole.) For arbitrary inputs, Farhi et al. showed that there exists an optimal quantum algorithm
in the Hamiltonian model to solve the Nand Tree in O(20.5d) time [5], and this was extended to
a standard discrete algorithm with quantum query complexity O(20.5d) [4, 10]. Classically, the best
algorithm requires Ω(20.753d) queries [12]. Here, we consider the 1-Fault Nand Tree, which is a
Nand Tree with a promise that the inputs satisfy certain conditions.
Definition 1. (1-Fault Nand Tree [13]) Consider a Nand Tree of depth d (as described above).
Then to each node v, we assign an integer κ(v) such that:
• κ(v) = 0 for leaf nodes.
• Otherwise v has children v1 and v2
If val(v1) = val(v2), κ(v) = maxi∈{1,2} κ(vi),
If val(v1) 6= val(v2), let vi be the node such that val(vi) = 0. Then κ(v) = 1 + κ(vi).
A tree satisfies the 1-fault condition if κ(v) ≤ 1 for any node v in the tree.
Notation: When a node has one child with value 1 and one child with value 0 (val(v1) 6= val(v2)),
we call the node v a fault. (Since nand(0, 1) = nand(1, 0) = 1, fault nodes must have value 1,
although not all 1-valued nodes are faults.)
The 1-fault condition is a limit on the amount and location of faults within the tree. In a
1-Fault Nand Tree, if a path moving from a root to a leaf encounters any fault node and then
passes through the 0-valued child of the fault node, there can be no further fault nodes on the path.
An example of a 1-Fault Nand Tree is given in Figure 1.
The condition of the 1-Fault Nand Tree may seem strange, but it has a nice interpretation
when considering the correspondence between Nand Trees and game trees3. The 1-Fault Nand
Tree corresponds to a game in which, if both players play optimally, there is at most one point
in the sequence of play where a player’s choice affects the outcome of the game. Furthermore, if
a player makes the wrong choice at the decision point, the game again becomes a single-decision
game, where if both players play optimally for the rest of play, there is at most one point where a
player’s choice affects the outcome of the game.
Zhan et al. [13] describe a quantum algorithm for the d-depth 1-Fault Nand Tree that
requires O(d2) queries to an oracle for the leaves. However, when the d-depth 1-Fault Nand
Tree is composed log d times, their algorithm requires only O(d3) queries. Here we see an example
where the number of queries required by a composed algorithm does not scale exponentially in
the number of compositions, which is critical for applying Theorem 1. Applying Theorem 1 to
the algorithm for the 1-Fault Nand Tree composed log d times, we find that an upper bound
on the query complexity of the 1-Fault Nand Tree is O(1). This is a large improvement over
O(d2) queries. Zhan et al. prove Ω(poly log d) is a lower bound on the classical query complexity of
1-Fault Nand Trees. An identical argument can be used to show that Constant-Fault Nand
Trees (from Definition 1, trees satisfying κ(v) ≤ c with c a constant) have query complexity O(1).
In fact, Zhan et al. find algorithms for a broad range of trees, where instead of nand, the
evaluation tree is composed of a type of Boolean function called a direct function. A direct function
is a generalization of a monotonic Boolean function, and includes functions like majority, threshold,
3See Scott Aaronson’s blog, Shtetl-Optimized, “NAND now for something completely different,"
http://www.scottaaronson .com/blog/?p=207
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Figure 1: An example of a 1-Fault Nand Tree of depth 4. Fault nodes are highlighted by a
double circle. The node v is a fault since one of its children (v1) has value 0, and one (v2) has
value 1. Among v1 and its children, there are no further faults, as required by the 1-fault condition.
There can be faults among v2 and its children, and indeed, v2 is a fault. There can be faults among
the 1-valued child of v2 and its children, but there can be no faults below the 0-valued child.
and their negations. For the exact definition, which involves span programs, see [13]. Similarly
to Constant-Fault Nand Trees, Zhan et al. give a quantum algorithm for Constant-Fault
Direct Trees requiring O(d2) queries and prove Ω(poly log d) is a lower bound on the classical
query complexity, while Theorem 1 can be used to prove the existence of O(1)-query algorithms for
Constant-Fault Direct Trees.
4 Span Program Algorithm for Constant-Fault Direct Trees
The structure of Constant-Fault Direct Trees can be quite complex, and it is not obvious that
there should be an O(1)-query algorithm. Inspired by the knowledge of the algorithm’s existence,
thanks to Theorem 1, we found a span program algorithm for Constant-Fault Direct Trees
that requires O(1) queries. It makes sense that the optimal algorithm uses span programs, not just
because span programs can always be used to create optimal algorithms [8], but because Theorem 1
is based on properties of the general adversary bound, and there is strong duality between the
general adversary bound and span programs.
Span programs are linear algebraic representations of Boolean functions, which have an intimate
relationship with quantum algorithms. In particular, Reichardt proves [9] that given a span program
P for a function f , there is a function of the span program called the witness size, such that one
can create a quantum algorithm for f with query complexity Q(f) satisfying
Q(f) = O(witness size(P )) (7)
Thus, creating a span program for a function is equivalent to creating a quantum query algorithm.
There have been many iterations of span program-based quantum algorithms, due to Reichardt
and others [8, 9, 11]. Zhan et al. create algorithms for direct Boolean functions [13] using the
span program formulation described in Definition 2.1 in [9], one of the earliest versions (we will not
go into the details of span programs in this paper). Using the more recent advancements in span
program technology, we show here:
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Theorem 2. Given an evaluation tree composed of the direct Boolean function f , with the promise
that the tree satisfies the k-fault condition (k a natural number), there is a quantum algorithm that
evaluates the tree using O(wk) queries, where w is a constant that depends on f . In particular, for
a Constant-Fault Direct Tree (k a constant), the algorithm requires O(1) queries.
While Theorem 1 promises the existence of O(1)-query quantum algorithms for Constant-
Fault Direct Trees, Theorem 2 gives an explicit O(1)-query quantum algorithm for these prob-
lems. The proof combines properties of the witness size of direct Boolean functions with a more
current version of span program algorithms.
First we define a k-Fault Direct Tree, which is a Boolean evaluation tree made up of a
direct Boolean function composed many times, with a promise on the input. The definition of direct
Boolean functions are a bit technical and are given in [13]; here we will just use their properties.
Given a direct Boolean function f with n inputs, a Direct Tree for f is a depth-d, n-partite
complete graph, where each node is given a Boolean value. The value of the node v, val(v) is given
by val(v) = f(val(v1), . . . , val(vn)) where vi is the ith child node of v. The values of the leaves are
given via an oracle, and the goal is to find the value of the root of the tree. A k-Fault Direct
Tree is a Direct Tree with inputs that satisfy certain conditions; the definition is similar to
Definition 1 for 1-Fault Nand Trees:
Definition 2. Let T be a Direct Tree for f . Let each node be labeled as fault or trivial based on
the values of its children and the specific function f used. For each node, depending on the values
of its children, a set of its child nodes are labeled strong in relation to the node, and the remaining
child nodes are labeled weak. For trivial nodes, all children are strong. Then to each node v we
assign an integer κ(v) such that:
• κ(v) = 0 for leaf nodes.
• Otherwise v has children {v1, . . . , vn}
If v is trivial, then κ(v) = maxi∈{1,...,n} κ(vi) = maxi:vi is strong κ(vi).
If v is a fault, then κ(v) = 1 + maxi:vi is strong κ(vi).
A tree satisfies the k-fault condition if κ(vr) ≤ k where vr is the root.
Notice that the restriction κ(vr) ≤ k is slightly relaxed compared to Definition 1, where it was
required that κ(v) ≤ 1 for all nodes v in the whole tree. Thus the span program algorithm we
describe below applies to an even broader range of trees than were included in the discussion in
Section 3.
For f = nand, a node whose two children have the same value (either both 0 or both 1), is
trivial, and a node with one 0-valued child and one 1-valued child is a fault. Furthermore, for
f = nand, for fault nodes, the 0-valued child is strong, and the 1-valued child is weak. One can
verify that with these designations, Definition 1 corresponds to Definition 2 for f = nand.
For a function f : S → {0, 1}, with S ⊆ {0, 1}n, input x ∈ S, and span program P , the
weighted witness size on input x is wsizes(P, x) where s ∈ (R+)n is the weighting vector. When
s = (1, . . . , 1), we write wsize1(P, x). Following [9], we rewrite Eq. (7) as
Q(f) = O
(
max
x∈S
wsize1(P, x)
)
(8)
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In [13], Zhan et al. show that for any direct Boolean function f , one can create a span program
P with the following properties4:
• wsize1(P, x) = 1 if input x makes the function trivial.
• wsize1(P, x) ≤ w, if input x makes the function a fault, where w is a constant depending
only on f .
• For wsizes(P, x), sj do not affect the witness size, where the jth input bit is weak.
To create an algorithm, we will combine these facts with Eq. (8) and the following composition
lemma:
Lemma 3. (based on Theorem 4.3 in [9]) Let f : S → {0, 1}, S ⊆ {0, 1}n and g : C → {0, 1},
C ⊆ {0, 1}m, and consider the composed function (f ◦ g)(x) with x = (x1, . . . , xn), xi ∈ C and
g(xi) ∈ S ∀i. Let x˜ = (g(x1), . . . , g(xn)) ∈ S. Let G be a span program for g, F be a span program
for f , and s ∈ (R+)n×m. Then there exists a span program P for f ◦ g such that
wsizes(P, x) ≤ wsizer(F, x˜) ≤ wsize1(F, x˜) max
i∈[n]
wsizesi(G, x
i) (9)
where r = (wsizes1(G, x1), . . . ,wsizesn(G, xn)) and si is a vector of the ith set of m elements of s.
The main difference between this lemma and that in [9] is that the witness size here is input
dependent, as is needed for partial functions. We also use a single inner function g instead of n
different functions gi, but we allow each inner function to have a different input. The proof of this
result follows exactly using the proof of Theorem 4.3 in [9], so we will not repeat it here.
Using the properties of strong and weak nodes in direct Boolean functions, we see thatwsizer(F, x˜)
in (9) doesn’t depend on ri = wsizesi(G, xi) for weak inputs i. Thus, we can rewrite Eq. (9) as
wsizes(P, x) ≤ wsize1(F, x˜) max
i∈[n]
s.t. i is strong
wsizesi(G, x
i). (10)
We now prove Theorem 2:
Proof. For a direct function f , we know there is a span program P such that wsize1(P, x) ≤ w for
all fault inputs and wsize1(P, x) = 1 for trivial inputs. We will show that this implies the existence
of a span program for the k-Fault Direct Tree with witness size ≤ wk.
We will use an inductive proof on k, the number of faults. For the base case, consider a depth
1 tree. This is just a single direct Boolean function. If its input makes the function a fault, using
the properties of direct Boolean functions, there is a span program for this input with witness size
at most w. If the depth 1 tree has has an input that makes the function trivial, there is a span
program for this input with witness size at most 1. Thus there exists quantum algorithm with query
complexity O(1) that evaluates this tree.
Consider a depth d, k-fault tree T with input x. We can think of this instead as a single direct
function f (with input x˜ and span program P ), composed with n subtrees of depth d− 1, where we
4We note that Zhan et al. use a different version of span programs than those used to prove Eq (8). However
Reichardt shows in [9] how to transform from one span program formulation to another, and proves that there is a
transformation from the span program formulation used by Zhan et al. to the one needed for Lemma 3 that does not
increase the witness size and that uses the weighting vector in the same way.
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label the ith subtree T i. Let PT i be a span program for T i, and we call the input to that subtree
xi. If x˜ makes f a fault, then by Eq (10) we know there exists a span program PT for T such that:
wsize1(PT , x) ≤ wsize1(P, x˜)× max
i∈[n]
i:i is strong
wsize1(PT i , x
i)
≤ w × max
i∈[n]
i:i is strong
wsize1(PT i , x
i). (11)
Now if we take the subtree T i∗ that maximizes the 2nd line, then by the definition of k-fault trees,
T i
∗ is a (k − 1)-fault tree. By inductive assumption, there is a span program for T i∗ satisfying
wsize1(PT i∗ , x
i) ≤ wk−1, so T satisfies wsize1(PT , x) ≤ wk, and there is a quantum algorithm for
the tree that uses O(wk) queries.
Given the same setup, but now assuming the input x˜ makes f trivial, then by Eq (10) we have:
wsize1(PT , x) ≤ wsize1(P, x˜)× max
i∈[n]
i:i is strong
wsize1(P i, xi)
= 1× max
i∈[n]
i:i is strong
wsize1(P i, xi). (12)
Now if we take the subtree T i∗ that maximizes the 2nd line, then by the definition of fault trees, T i∗
is a κ fault tree with κ ≤ k. But we know if κ ≤ k − 1, then wsize1(PT i∗ , xi) ≤ wk−1 by inductive
assumption, so we’re done in that case. So instead we assume κ = k. Thus we have reduced the
problem to a smaller depth tree, and we can repeat the above procedure until we find the first
subtree with a fault at its root (in which case we are back to the previous case) or show that there
are no further faults in the tree (in which case the tree can be evaluated in O(1) queries). Since the
tree has finite depth, this procedure will terminate.
5 Conclusions
We describe a method for upper bounding the quantum query complexity of Boolean functions
using the general adversary bound. Using this method, we show that Constant-Fault Direct
Trees can always be evaluated using O(1) queries. Furthermore, we create an algorithm with a
matching upper bound using span programs.
We would like to find other examples where Theorem 1 is useful, although we suspect that
Constant-Fault Direct Trees are a somewhat unique case. It is clear from the span program
algorithm described in Section 4 that Theorem 1 will not be useful for composed functions where
the base function is created using this type of span program. However, there could be other types
of quantum walk algorithms, for example, to which Theorem 1 might be applied. In any case, this
work suggests that new ways of upper bounding the general adversary bound could give us a second
window into quantum query complexity beyond algorithms.
Beside the practical application of Theorem 1, the result tells us something abstract and general
about the structure of quantum algorithms. There is a natural way that quantum algorithms should
compose, and if an algorithm does not compose in this natural way, then one knows that something
is non-optimal.
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A Composition Proof
In this section, we will prove Lemma 1:
Lemma 1. For any Boolean function f : S → {0, 1} with S ⊆ {0, 1}n and natural number d,
ADV±(fd) ≥ (ADV±(f))d. (1)
This proof follows Appendix C from Lee et al. [8] very closely, including most notation. The
difference between this Lemma and that in [8] is that f is allowed to be partial. We write out most
of the proof again because it is subtle where the partiality of f enters the proof, and to allow this
appendix to be read without constant reference to [8].
First, we use an expression for the general adversary bound derived from the dual program of
the general adversary bound:
ADV±(g) = max
W, Ω◦I=Ω
W • J
subject to W ◦G = 0
Ω±W ◦∆i  0
Tr(Ω) = 1 (13)
where g : C → {0, 1}, with C ⊆ {0, 1}m and all matrices are indexed by x, y ∈ C, so e.g. [W ]xy is
the element of W in the row corresponding to input x and column corresponding to input y. W can
always be chosen to be symmetric. G satisfies [G]xy = δg(x),g(y), and ∆i satisfies [∆i]xy = 1− δxi,yi ,
with xi the value of the ith bit of the input x. We call ∆i the filtering matrix.  0 means positive
semidefinite, J is the all 1’s matrix, and W • J means take the sum of all elements of W . When ◦
is used between uppercase or Greek letters, it denotes Hadamard product, while between lowercase
letters, it denotes composition.
We want to determine the adversary bound for a composed function f ◦ g consisting of the
functions g : C → {0, 1} with C ⊆ {0, 1}m and f : S → {0, 1} with S ⊆ {0, 1}n. We consider
the input to f ◦ g to be a vector of inputs x = (x1, . . . , xn) with xi ∈ C. Given an input x to the
composed function, we denote the input to the f part of the function as x˜: x˜ = (g(x1), . . . , g(xn)).
Let (W,Ω) be an optimal solution for g with ADV±(g) = dg and (V,Λ) be an optimal solution for
f with ADV±(f) = df . To clarify the filtering matrices, we say ∆
g
q is indexed by inputs to g, ∆fp is
indexed by inputs to f , and ∆f◦g(p,q) is indexed by inputs to the composed function f ◦ g. (So ∆f◦g(p,q)
refers to the (pm+ q)th bit of the input string.)
We assume that the initial input x = (x1, . . . , xn) is valid for the g part of the composition, i.e.
xi ∈ C ∀i. A problem might arise if x˜, the input to f , is not an element of S. This is an issue that
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Lee et al. do not have to deal with, but which might affect the proof. Here we show that the proof
goes through with small modifications.
The main new element we introduce is a set of primed matrices, which extend the matrices
indexed by inputs to f to be indexed by all elements of {0, 1}n, not just those in S. For a primed
matrix A′, indexed by x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, if x /∈ S or y /∈ S, then [A′]xy = 0. We use similar notation
for matrices indexed by x = (x1, . . . , xn) where x˜ ∈ S; we create primed matrices by extending the
indeces to all inputs x by making those elements with x˜ /∈ S have value 0. Notice if the extended
matrices (W ′,Ω′) are a solution to the dual program, then the reduced matrices (W,Ω) are also
a solution. For matrices A′ indexed by {0, 1}n, we define a new matrix A˜′ indexed by Cn, as
[A˜′]xy = [A′]x˜y˜, where x˜ is the output of the g functions on the input x, and likewise for y˜ and y.
A˜′ expands each element of A′ into a block of elements.
Before we get to the main lemma, we will need a few other results:
Lemma 4. [8] Let M ′ be a matrix labeled by x ∈ {0, 1}n, and M˜ ′ be defined as above. Then if
M ′  0, M˜ ′  0.
Proof. This claim is stated without proof in [8]. M˜ ′ is created by turning all of the elements of
M ′ into block matrices with repeated inputs. When an index x ∈ {0, 1}n is expanded to a block
of k elements, there are k − 1 eigenstates of M˜ ′ that only have nonzero elements on this block and
that have eigenvalue 0. By considering all 2n blocks (each element of {0, 1}n becomes a block) we
obtain 2n(k− 1) 0-valued eigenvectors. Next we use the eigenvectors ~vi of M ′ to create new vectors
~˜vi in the space of M˜ ′. We give every element in the xth block of ~˜vi the value ~vi(x)/k, where ~vi(x)
is the xth element of ~vi. The vectors ~˜vi complete the basis with the 0-valued eigenvectors, and are
orthogonal to the 0-valued vectors, but not to each other. However, the ~˜vi have the property that
~˜viT M˜ ′~˜vj = δijλi where λi is the eigenvalue of ~vi, so λi ≥ 0. Thus using these vectors as a basis, we
have that ~uT M˜ ′~u ≥ 0 for all vectors ~u.
The following is identical to Claim C.1 from [8] and follows because there is no restriction that
g be a total function. Thus we state it without proof:
Lemma 5. For a function g, there is a solution to the dual program, (W,Ω), such that ADV±(g) =
dg, dgΩ±W  0, and
∑
x:g(x)=1 Ω(x, x) =
∑
x:g(x)=0 Ω(x, x) = 1/2.
In Lemma 6, we will show that ADV±(f ◦ g) = ADV±(f)ADV±(g), which implies Lemma 1.
Lemma 6. A solution to the dual program for f ◦ g is (U,Υ), where (U ′,Υ′) = (c × V˜ ′ ◦ (dgΩ +
W )⊗n, c× dn−1g Λ˜′ ◦Ω⊗n) and c = 2nd−(n−1)g . (U,Υ) give the adversary bound ADV±(f ◦ g) = dgdf .
Proof. The first thing to check is that U ′ and Υ′ are valid primed matrices, or otherwise we can
not recover U and Υ. Because each of U ′ and Υ′ are formed by Hadamard products with primed
matrices, they themselves are also primed matrices.
We next calculate the objective function, and afterwards check that (U ′,Υ′) satisfy the conditions
of the dual program.
The objective function gives:
J • (cV˜ ′ ◦ (dgΩ +W )⊗n) = c
∑
a,b∈S
f(a)6=f(b)
[V ]ab
∑
x,y
x˜=a,y˜=b
∏
i
(dg[Ω]xiyi + [W ]xiyi)
= c
∑
a,b∈S
f(a)6=f(b)
[V ]ab
∏
i
∑
xi,yi
g(xi)=ai
g(yi)=bi
(dg[Ω]xiyi + [W ]xiyi) (14)
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where in the first line we’ve replaced V ′ by V because adding extra 0’s does not affect the sum. In
the second line, ai and bi are the ith bits of a and b respectively, and we’ve changed the order of
multiplication and addition. This ordering change is not affected by the fact that f is partial, since
the first summation already fixes an input to f .
We now examine the sum ∑
xi,yi
g(xi)=ai
g(yi)=bi
(dg[Ω]xiyi + [W ]xiyi). (15)
We consider the cases ai = bi, and ai 6= bi separately. When ai = bi, because W ◦ G = 0, we
know that [W ]xiyi = 0, so in this case, only [Ω]xiyi is non-zero. Since Ω is diagonal, it only has
non-zero values when xi = yi, and using Lemma 5, the sum is dg/2. When ai 6= bi, then xi 6= yi,
so [Ω]xiyi = 0. In this case, the sum will include exactly half of the elements of W : either those
elements with g(xi) = 0 and g(yi) = 1, or with g(xi) = 1 and g(yi) = 0. Since W is symmetric,
this amounts to 12W • J = dg/2. Multiplying n times for the product over the i′s and using the
definition of the objective function for f gives the final result:
J • (cV˜ ′ ◦ (dgΩ +W )⊗n) = c× df
(
dg
2
)n
= dfdg (16)
Now we show that U ′ and Υ′ satisfy the conditions of the dual program. We require that
[U ′]xy = 0 for (f ◦ g)(x) = (f ◦ g)(y). Notice U ′ = 0 whenever V˜ ′ = 0, and [V˜ ′]xy = 0 for
(f ◦ g)(x) = (f ◦ g)(y), so this requirement holds. Likewise Υ′ is a diagonal matrix because it can
only be nonzero where Ω⊗n is non-zero, and Ω⊗n is diagonal.
Next we will show that Υ′ ± U ′ ◦ (∆f◦q(p,q))′  0. From Lemma 5 and from the conditions on the
dual programs for f and g, we have dgΩ ±W  0, Ω ±W ◦ ∆gq  0, and Λ′ ± V ′ ◦ (∆fp)′  0.
Then by Lemma 4, Λ˜′± V˜ ′ ◦ (∆˜fp)′  0. Since tensor and Hadamard products preserve semidefinite
positivity, we get
0  (Λ˜′ ± V˜ ′ ◦ (∆˜fp)′) ◦
(
(dgΩ +W )
⊗(p−1) ⊗ (Ω +W ◦∆gq)⊗ (dgΩ +W )⊗(n−p)
)
, (17)
where these matrices are indexed by all elements of Cn. [W ]xiyi = 0 for x = y while Λ˜′ is only
nonzero for elements [Λ˜′]xy with x = y, so any terms involving a Hadamard of W and Λ˜′ are 0.
Similarly, the Ω in the pth tensor product is only nonzero for xp = yp, but for these inputs, the term
(∆˜fp)′ is always zero, so in fact the non-zero terms of this Ω do not contribute. Thus we are free to
replace this Ω with dgΩ ◦∆gq . We obtain
0 dn−1g Λ˜′ ◦ Ω⊗n ± (V˜ ′ ◦ (∆˜fp)′) ◦
(
(dgΩ +W )
⊗(p−1) ⊗ (dgΩ ◦∆gq +W ◦∆gq)⊗ (dgΩ +W )⊗(n−p)
)
0 dn−1g Λ˜′ ◦ Ω⊗n ± (V˜ ′ ◦ (∆˜fp)′) ◦
(
(dgΩ +W )
⊗n ◦ {J⊗(p−1) ⊗∆gq ⊗ J⊗(n−p)}
)
. (18)
Finally, the term (∆˜fp)′ can be written as J −G acting on only the pth term in the tensor product
(dgΩ +W )
⊗n, so we need to evaluate (J −G) ◦ (dgΩ +W ) ◦∆gq . We have (J −G) ◦Ω = ∆gq ◦Ω = 0,
and (J −G) ◦W = W , so we can remove (∆˜fp)′ without altering the expression.
Now the term {J⊗(p−1) ⊗∆gq ⊗ J⊗(n−p)} is almost ∆f◦g(p,q), except it is like a primed matrix; its
indeces are all elements in Cn, not just valid inputs to f , yet it is not primed, in that some of its
elements to non-valid inputs to f are non-zero. However it is involved in a Hadamard product with
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V˜ ′, a primed matrix, so all of the terms corresponding to non-valid inputs are zeroed, and we can
make it be a primed matrix without affecting the expression. We obtain
0 dn−1g Λ˜′ ◦ Ω⊗n ± (V˜ ′ ◦
(
(dgΩ +W )
⊗n ◦ (∆f◦g(p,q))′
)
, (19)
which is precisely the positivity constraint of the dual program.
Finally, we need to check that Tr(cdn−1g Λ˜′ ◦ Ω⊗n) = 1:
Tr(cdn−1g Λ˜
′ ◦ Ω⊗n) = cdn−1g
∑
a∈S
[Λ]aa
∑
x:x˜=a
∏
i
[Ω]xixi
= cdn−1g
∑
a∈S
[Λ]aa
∏
i
∑
xi:g(xi)=ai
[Ω]xixi
= cdn−1g
(
1
2
)n
= 1, (20)
where all of the tricks here follow similarly from the discussion following Eq. (14).
Lemma 1 now follows from Lemma 6 along with a simple inductive argument.
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